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FOREWORD
On December 11, 1994, Russia invaded the secessionist
republic of Chechnya in the North Caucasus. The aim was to
suppress the republic's government, led by General Dzhokar
Dudayev, compel it to accept Moscow's authority, and to force it
to renounce its bid for independence and sovereignty. This
invasion, which quickly turned into a military quagmire for
Russia's troops, triggered a firestorm of domestic opposition,
even within the higher levels of the Ministry of Defense. As a
result, the invasion has the most profound and troubling possible
consequences for the stability of the Russian government, Russian
democracy, and the future political- military relationship.
This special report, based on what is already known,
attempts to assess the discernible consequences of this invasion
and provide a framework within which future developments can be
assessed. It is offered as a contribution to the debate on this
timely issue.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
In December 1994, Russian forces invaded the rebellious
province of Chechnya. They aimed to unseat General Dzhokar
Dudayev, who had proclaimed Chechnya's independence from Russia.
The invasion culminated a series of failed coups against Dudayev
that had been orchestrated by the office of Russian President
Boris Yeltsin. However, this invasion has quickly degenerated
into a military-political quagmire. Generals, soldiers, and even
Deputy Defense Ministers have attacked the invasion, and
tactical, operational, and military incompetence has been rife.
Civilian control over the military has broken down, and the armed
forces' poor cohesion and limited reliability have become clear
to everyone. Furthermore, the government's reporting has been
exposed as official lying by the media with the result of
mounting public disaffection.
Worse yet, the integrity of the Yeltsin government and of
Russia is at risk due to the invasion. Russian prestige has been
dealt a blow abroad. As a result, in Moscow, scapegoating has
already begun between the government and the military while the
reputation and stability of the government and the armed forces
have been severely impaired. All this is already clear from an
initial, preliminary assessment of the invasion.
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RUSSIA'S INVASION OF CHECHNYA:
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
Introduction.
When Russia's armed forces invaded Chechnya on December 11,
1994, they thought that it would only be a brief, decisive
operation to bring the rebellious republic to heel.
Unfortunately, they grossly miscalculated and have thereby put
the stability of the Russian government itself at risk while
inadvertently exposing the many shortcomings of the Russian armed
forces. The invasion also revealed the absence of viable
institutional or civilian control over the armed forces, as well
as the government's readiness to use them to quell domestic
unrest. These factors make for an exceedingly dangerous situation
in Russia. And the invasion has also raised deeply troubling
questions for Russia's international relations. All this is clear
even from the first few weeks of the invasion. The invasion's
repercussions will, therefore, be profound, and probably
long-lasting in their ultimate effects. This essay accordingly
represents an effort to assess these consequences on the basis of
what is already known.
Chechnya, which had declared its independence from Russia in
1991, had become an increasingly painful and troublesome issue in
Russian politics. Russia's determination to overthrow the
government of General Dzhokar Dudayev is only the most recent
manifestation of the acute disorder that pervades the entire
Caucasus and Transcaucasia as well. While the ultimate outcome
and repercussions of this invasion remain to be seen, already it
has illuminated obvious and often ominous trends.
Russia's decision to invade Chechnya underscores the end of
the Caucasus' isolation from world politics. No longer is the
area merely Moscow's gateway to influence in the Near and Middle
East. Rather the fate of the entire regional state system in the
Caucasus and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)--the
bedrock issue of all the many contentions in which Russia is
involved--is deeply entwined with further progress in European
1
security, especially around the Black Sea and Balkans. The
crises in the Caucasus: ethnic wars in Nagorno-Karabakh and
between Georgia and Abkhazia, the unrest throughout the North
Caucasus most violently displayed by this invasion, and Russian
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efforts to regain a regional hegemony reflect and contribute to
the pervasive regional chaos that now threatens to engulf all of
Russia as well. Accordingly Caucasian events also materially
affect Europe's security and this is reflected in Europe's
2
expanded security agenda.
A second conclusion relates to this one. By deciding to
invade Chechnya, President Boris Yeltsin has made the stability
of the Russian government and the integrity of the Russian state
the center of gravity of the war. Whatever happens in Groznyi is
of relatively small consequence compared to the fact that Yeltsin
has exposed his regime's failure to create either a "rule of law
state," (not to mention democracy), a reliable policy process,
and a way to control Russia's armed forces. Accordingly, the
chaos pervading the entire Caucasus could easily spread to
Russia.
The fundamental problem across the CIS remains, therefore,
the creation of effective states which have a legitimate monopoly
on the use of force. Neither the states in the Caucasus, the
rebellious provinces there, nor Russia have produced a
Machtordnung (an order based on power) uniting force with
legitimacy. Hence there is no order; instead we find a Hobbesian
war of all against all where Russia or free-booting forces
3
operating in Russia's name are constantly tempted to intervene.
Though violence is regionally prevalent, it has failed to
generate a principle of order anywhere from Russia south.
Accordingly a third conclusion suggests itself, namely that
for the first time in its modern history, Russia has nothing to
offer the Asian peoples with whom it is engaged. In the past
Russia built an empire by combining force with ideas, ideologies,
and institutions that attracted at least some Asian elites who
were then coopted. Today Russia has nothing to offer these people
other than force. No attractive legitimating ideology accompanies
Russia's direct force, therefore that force cannot suffice to
create any viable regional order across Eurasia. For this reason,
perhaps the most dangerous aspect of this cycle of constant
strife is that it has now spread to Russian territory proper and
has manifested itself as a major threat to Yeltsin's government.
Russia's overall Chechen policy has had a corrosive impact on
Russian constitutional and internal security.
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Chechnya has also become a major embarrassment for Moscow on
the international stage because, on the one hand, Russia now
appears to be indecisive and weak, and on the other hand it
appears as an overbearing, brutal bully. Incompetence mixed with
brutality is a pitiful combination. Where that corrosion will
stop nobody knows. Indeed this inability to visualize an outcome
or resolution to the use of military power, a conflict
termination strategy in other words, is a major aspect of the
profound strategic failure represented in Chechnya.
The Threat to the Russian State.
The greatest danger to Russia in its Chechen invasion lies
in the fact that Yeltsin has put not only Defense Minister Pavel
Grachev's authority on the line by this operation, but he also
4
has put his own power and that of the Russian state at risk. The
issue in Chechnya is not merely preventing other regional
formations from following its example, leading to a breakup of
Russia itself; rather the Russian state's own cohesion is what is
now at stake. The fact that an invasion occurred testifies to the
absence of any existing state of law in Russia. Yeltsin can
indeed call out troops without accounting to anyone or any
agency. Furthermore that force will remain not the final argument
of Russian authorities, but the first argument. Parliamentarians
like Yegor Gaidar are right to worry that this operation heralds
5
the government's reliance on "national patriots." But the
malaise goes deeper than that.
It is clear that Russian democracy has failed since Russia's
current government exists in a vacuum of social-political forces
and answers to nobody. Though one may call Russia a democracy,
Yeltsin and his government are not operating under any rule of
law nor is institutional stability in sight. Indeed, the CIA has
suggested that coherent, legitimate political leadership in
6
Moscow is in danger. In 1993, in a remark worthy of his Tsarist
predecessors, Yeltsin observed that he only answers to his
conscience. Today the Tsarist model still pervades defense
decision making. Indeed, Yeltsin's power and authority reside
7
neither in law nor other structures, but in his own person. Much
as in Tsarist times, key figures in the government despise each
other and are constantly intriguing one against the other. Not
surprisingly this fact suits Yeltsin since he can play one off
against the other. This condition is a pervasive, recurrent
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feature of the Tsarist bureaucratic structure which has
resurfaced in the post-Soviet period. As Otto Latsis, a member of
the consultative presidential committee remarked, "The problem is
not so much that decision-making procedures have been breached,
8
but that there are no procedures at all."
However, the absence of viable, regular, and coherent
political institutions makes it almost certain that failure in
Chechnya will threaten the power of the president, just as failed
wars challenged the power of every Tsar who waged them. Yeltsin
and Grachev alone are on the firing line especially now, when
television viewers can see the truth on a daily basis and Russian
society is no longer easily manipulated by propaganda or amenable
to Tsarist-like rule.
The Chechen War and Its Immediate Consequences.
It is hard to believe that the Russian army has found it so
difficult to overwhelm and defeat the Chechen rebels. Whether or
not Russian forces occupy Groznyi and install a puppet
government, the consequences of the invasion will eclipse local
events in Chechnya in importance. Those consequences have already
undermined Russia's domestic constitution and government and they
will weaken its international position as well.
The first consequence of this war is a demonstrable absence
of any viable system of civilian control over the military. In
defiance of the 1992 Law on Defense, the army was used on the
Russian population without any recourse to Parliament. Indeed the
government denied it was going to invade Chechnya and, in
September 1994, Yeltsin said that "under no circumstances" would
9
there be an invasion. This 1992 law is obviously most
inconvenient for the government which has submitted draft laws on
defense and peacemaking that reserve to Yeltsin alone the power
to call out the army for any contingency without recourse to
Parliament for permission, funding, or authorization. As the
Duma's overall evaluation of the new draft Law on Defense
observes, the provisions on the armed forces' structure and
objectives are never really confirmed by legislation "and they
are left hostage in their entirety to executive structures of
10
government."
As for the legal justification of the invasion, it too is
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cloudy at best. Chechnya refused to sign the Federation Treaty of
1992 that regulates relationships among Russia's republics and
the central government. But that treaty stipulates that a state
of emergency may be declared in a republic only with the local
government's agreement. Yet even if the emergency is contained
within only one republic, e.g. Chechnya, the local government
must inform the President of Russia and the Supreme Soviet
(presumably today that would mean the Federation Council and the
Duma) of the Russian Federation and act according to federal laws
11
during the state of emergency. The 1993 Russian constitution
also states that the President may impose a state of emergency on
his own if he immediately notifies the Federation Council and
State Duma. While the presidential decision enters into force
immediately, it only remains in force for three days until and
12
unless the Federation council extends the state of emergency.
But Yeltsin did not declare any state of emergency before the
invasion or communicate with the Parliament's two houses. So the
invasion is illegal even by Russia's legal standards. Chechnya's
refusal to sign the treaty put it outside the law, but what can
we say of the Russian government that broke the treaty without
accounting for its actions to any institution?
Essentially this invasion manifests a return to a
quasi-Tsarist way of governing. As was the case under the Tsarist
and Soviet systems, the Kremlin is not accountable to anyone.
Furthermore, its defense decision-making process is characterized
by a small group of unaccountable men making secret and
calamitous decisions. Their decisions are justified by either
resorting to the old Soviet "big lie" technique or by outright
13
repression and phony accusations against the independent media.
Such practices are too easily invoked in Russia to reassure
advocates of democracy there.
As part of this formula of nonaccountability and resort to
mendacious propaganda we also find the disturbing possibility
that officials deliberately may be misleading or misinforming
Yeltsin. In his speech to the nation on December 27, 1994,
Yeltsin claimed the opposition press was motivated by political
ambition and Chechen bribes. Furthermore, he maintained that
Russia was ready to move over to the administrative
reconstitution of a new Chechen government in Groznyi. None of
this was true. Worse yet, after he announced that Russia would
stop the terror bombing of Groznyi, it continued for several days
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without letup. Deliberate screening of information and deception
of the autocrat were other hallmarks of Tsarist rule. And the
deliberate use of misinformation on the population was, of
course, another such hallmark. In this war there have been
numerous instances of such official lying that have been exposed
by the independent media, much to the government's discomfiture.
The danger is that in the present context of institutional
incoherence and fragility, such misinformation (if not
disinformation of and by one's own government) can only lead to
further loss of control by Yeltsin and the top military command.
This could lead to even greater strategic catastrophes.
Even before this invasion it had become clear that Boris
Yeltsin would not allow any other civilian to control the
military, seemingly out of fear that a rival might develop his
own power base. But it was also clear that the armed forces, like
the government, were factionalized. The Minister of Defense
depends completely on Yeltsin for his job, and must support his
decisions and carry them out even more zealously than would
otherwise be the case. At the same time the President and the
Minister of Defense have become a law unto themselves in that no
14
other institution is allowed to oversee defense policy. In other
words, in defense policy, Yeltsin's personal decree or whim has
become law. But since law has no legitimacy where force and
caprice rule, parliamentary opponents quickly labelled this war
as illegitimate. Furthermore, the media's reporting demolished
the flimsy lies behind which Chechen policy had been conducted.
This is one key reason for the attacks on the media even before
the war. These physical and rhetorical attacks suggest the
Kremlin's inner circle is unwilling to be held accountable for
its actions, an unwillingness that can only strengthen
antidemocratic tendencies within the government. In part, this
explains why the Ministry of Interior (MVD) forces took up
preventive positions in Moscow and arrested Chechens there now.
(If they were criminals before the invasion, why not arrest them
then?)
That refusal to answer for the presidency's actions might
also be a motive for invading at this time according to Pavel
Felgengauer, the defense correspondent of Segodnya, and Russia's
most prominent defense reporter. According to Felgengauer the
invasion came at this time to forestall any parliamentary
investigation of the previous five failed coups undertaken by the
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government in Chechnya. These coups (discussed below) were
directly traceable to Yeltsin's office and the Intelligence
Service (FSK), and employed regular troops from the armed forces.
Any investigation would undoubtedly have produced a major
15
scandal.
The invasion's second consequence flows from the first.
Absent civilian control over the military and laws binding on
everyone, key members of the armed forces can then plausibly
argue against this or any other operation, especially a domestic
one, on the grounds of conscience as well as on professional
ones. Thus two deputy ministers of defense, General Boris Gromov
and General Georgii Kondrat'ev; the Deputy CINC of the Army, Col.
General Edvard Vorob'ev; and one of the commanding officers in
the field, General Viktor Babichev, all attacked the operation or
refused to participate.
This phenomenon not only underscores the pervasive lack of
respect for Grachev and Yeltsin among the military, it also
highlights the essential unreliability of the army when it comes
16
to quelling domestic unrest. Efforts to impose such repression
elsewhere could conceivably break the state apart. Those who
argued that the army supported Yeltsin in 1993 overlooked the
fact that when called on to defend the state against rebels the
army either temporized or refused. Instead it only attacked the
rebels after the latter rashly and forcefully attacked the army
and the people. Arguably the army was not defending only Yeltsin,
17
but rather itself, a fact not lost on Yeltsin. The Chechen
operation, or other similar and especially concurrent ones,
could, if protracted, lead to massive military disobedience on
the scale of February 1917, especially since commanders and
troops are visibly unhappy with this war.
These trends therefore demonstrate an absence of unity of
command at the top, a fact that casts doubt on the merit of using
the army for any strategic operation. This is not only a question
of domestic but also of foreign missions, and it makes the use of
the army anywhere a most problematic affair. Given Yeltsin's and
Grachev's widespread loss of status, it is hardly clear that they
can compel full compliance to orders for any particular military
operation. The fact that the terror bombing of Groznyi continued
for two days after Yeltsin said that it would stop suggests that
local commanders conceivably disregarded that order. If so, that
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would be another indication of the dangers of lack of control
over the armed forces. Consequently, the army's performance in
Chechnya has exposed its shortcomings in command and control to
the world.
Yet, at the same time, Yeltsin and Grachev (and the others
involved in the plan) have demonstrated their fidelity to the
tenets of the 1993 defense doctrine stating the army can and will
18
be used to quell domestic unrest. Since Grachev wants the
doctrine accepted as a legally binding document upon state
institutions (as was the case in Soviet times), the government is
playing for the highest stakes with dubious cards. A
fundamentally illegitimate and lawless regime (only 46 percent of
voters approved the existing constitution which, in any case, has
been superseded by this action) effectively has announced that
although it lacks control over commanders and soldiers, it will
call out troops at home and, in so doing, perhaps violate its own
Federation Treaty and Constitution. Although the Chechen
government had defied Moscow for three years and thus the threat
to Russia dates from 1991, Moscow only called out the troops now
after the five failed coup attempts. This suggests that little or
no long-range planning went into the operation. Rather, it was
ordered in a state of some panic or urgency for reasons going
beyond any Chechen threat.
The implications of this are enormous. The regime is liable
to call out troops at home with little or no consideration as to
consequences and for reasons having to do as much with covering
up its own failures as with the potential "threat" posed by the
insurgents. The determination to employ military force at home
also reflects a broader process at work. Already by late 1993,
the MVD had mounted tens of costly operations in the North
Caucasus and Moscow, and was becoming the preferred instrument
for quelling and pacifying internal unrest once the army had
19
initially suppressed the local fighting.
At the same time, the armed forces' tactical and operational
deficiencies have been exposed for little reason. Naturally this
greatly embarrasses the Russian Army and the government.
Observers of the military had long known that draftees were
increasingly deficient in health, physical training, education,
character (probably about one-third being criminals), and morale.
Significant numbers of Russian troops surrendering, the
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widespread evidence of a breakdown of logistics, poor training,
troops being transported in sealed cars with no briefing
concerning conditions at the front, or not being given sufficient
food, and the widespread desire not to fight in this war all
point to severe limitations on the army's reliability and
competence. Indeed, Ingushetia's President, Ruslan Aushev, told
the Russian Federation Council and a news conference on December
15, 1994, that soldiers in the columns crossing Ingushetia had
often urged protesters to disable military vehicles and shown
20
them how to do it. On the other hand the demoralization of the
armed forces also showed up in incidents of brutality towards
Muslim servicemen (a Bashkir) and Ingush civilians, all of whom
were murdered in killings that were reported by a number of Duma
21
members.
Russia may still consider itself a superpower, but its army
was not up to this effort. Given the extent of Russian interests
abroad, it is unlikely that these forces could adequately defend
them all. Just as the army is an instrument of questionable
utility at home, under some circumstances it might not be much
better abroad. Therefore this invasion, like the crisis of the
military economy at home, highlights the fact that the
instruments of power at Russia's disposal are not commensurate
with Russia's strategic claims and interests. Inasmuch as the
government shows too easily a willingness to deploy these
unreliable armed forces, this insolvency (to use Walter
Lippmann's term) can only raise the greatest fears for Russia and
its neighbors.
This incommensurability also pertains to the war's economic
aspect. By December 23, 1994, the government had already spent
400 billion rubles on the war and was forced to propose a still
larger outlay for Chechnya's peacetime reconstruction if and when
22
that occurs. By the end of 1994, officials were estimating that
the costs of rebuilding Chechnya would reach 3.5 trillion rubles
and there is no source for the money. And the costs associated
with sending and maintaining 40,000 troops there is included in
that figure, making the total cost at the start of 1995 at least
23
$1 billion (U.S.). These expenditures will break the budget and
explode the fiction that Russia could somehow conform to the
International Monetary Fund's dictates and continue receiving
subsidies. Instead, inflation and defense spending will grow
together. Indeed, one cynical view is that Grachev urged the
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invasion precisely to increase defense spending. He and the
military were certainly bitter about the government's and Duma's
failure to heed their exorbitant budget demands. That their
budget requirements would destroy the economy seemed largely
24
inconsequential to the military. Thus, not only does the war
call into question the vitality of the army and the health of
Russian democracy, but it also further strains Russia's economy.
However, perhaps the most dismaying military and domestic
aspect of the war is that it shows the regime's utter strategic
incompetence, not only in facing the Chechen challenge but also
in assessing Russia's true options and capabilities. This failure
particularly relates to four issues: the reasons for resorting to
a large military operation, failure to assess the Chechen and
Russian forces realistically, failure to understand the media's
role, and, most importantly, the failure to see that there could
be no victory here. No one in the Kremlin apparently had an end
state in mind or conceived of a conflict resolution or
termination strategy. The planners were misled by the old Russian
belief that a mere show of force would quickly intimidate the
Muslims into submission.
Russian efforts to suppress Chechnya date to 1991 and even
then showed a dangerous proclivity to impose undemocratic and
25
unrealistic solutions in the North Caucasus. The general reasons
for intervening: to preserve Russian integrity, enhance Yeltsin's
and/or Grachev's stature, bolster the defense budget, overcome
internal political disaffection by a `splendid little war,' and
to suppress a rebellion that threatened internal security and
criminality, are all well known.
But we must ask why invade now with such sizable forces?
Indeed, some observers believed that before the summer and the
coups described below, progress towards a solution was taking
26
place. Sadly, the answer apparently is that Moscow invaded out
of pique. The current masters of the Kremlin would have done well
to read Lenin's Political Testament wherein he wrote, "in
general, spite plays the very worst role in politics." Before
November 1994, Russia mounted at least four covert operations
against Chechnya, all of which failed. These operations began in
mid-1992 and were intensified in the summer of 1994 when Yeltsin
signed an "instruction" releasing 150 billion rubles of state
funds for action against Chechnya. Reports from captured Russian
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officers indicate that the "mechanism of intervention" included
organizing mass flights of criminals from prison, and recruiting
Chechen criminals from Russia. All these sources indicate that
overall authorship and supervision of the plot against Chechnya
came from Russia's Ministry of Nationalities, under Sergei
Shakhray, the Foreign Intelligence Service (Federativnyi Sluzhba
Kontrrazvedki- FSK), and Vladimir Lozovoy, head of the North
Ossetian and Ingushetian Interim Administration. This latter
organization reputedly operates under the direction of Sergei
27
Filatov, chief of Yeltsin's administration. This evidence
apparently confirms the claim that the FSK and MVD blindsided the
Ministry of Defense which was led to claim falsely that no
Russian troops were involved in these operations. This denial
took place despite the fact that the FSK had gained operational
control over the forces sent into Chechnya in the fall of 1994,
in the fifth and last covert operation before the current
28
attack.
This evidence itself signifies a dangerous lack of
governmental control over regular and covert military forces and
operations. It also implicates Russia in the coup against the
Aliyev government in Azerbaijan in the fall of 1994, an operation
that started in the same way with a mass prison break followed by
an uprising. Inasmuch as previous coups in Baku also indicate the
heavy involvement of covert Russian forces, it appears that the
29
FSK has taken over the KGB's mission of coup-making abroad. The
resort to black operations--and their public failure--can only
undermine the authority of the FSK, Yeltsin, and the armed
forces. Moreover, to the degree that coups in both rebellious
provinces and sovereign states become identified as habitual
Russian modus operandi to secure Moscow's interests, Russia's
international position will also suffer as foreign suspicion of
its policies and goals increases.
Frustrated by the failure of their first four operations,
the MVD, FSK, and the government mounted a fifth one involving
supposed anti-Dudayev volunteers in November 1994. This, too,
ignominiously failed and Dudayev exposed to the world the
involvement of Russian troops. This public embarrassment
undoubtedly enraged Yeltsin, Grachev, and other leaders who were
shown to have been blindsided by the FSK, and not fully in
control of their own armed forces. Grachev, who had gone on
television to deny the involvement of Russian troops, must have
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been particularly embarrassed. Even though Yeltsin and Grachev
subsequently made a pretense of negotiations while they were
massing troops, that was clearly a ruse. The Kremlin had decided
on war to avenge its failure.
And the inner circle all thought this splendid little war
would be a walkover. Grachev said that one paratroop regiment
would suffice to conquer Chechnya in two hours, a sign not only
30
of arrogance but of utter strategic incomprehension. They
believed that a single crushing blow was all that was needed. No
resistance was expected, nor did the planners count on the fact
that massing troops in the neighboring North Caucasian Muslim
republics would stimulate their active opposition as well.
Therefore, when significant opposition did come, it disoriented
the troops who had been screened from the media and were told
there would be no opposition; that they were only fighting a band
of criminals.
Nor did the planners count on the reluctance of commanders
to fire on unarmed civilians or on the corrosive effects on the
military of official lying during Russia's first "television
war." Free broadcasting from the war zone belied the hollow
claims made about a lack of Russian or civilian casualties and
brought into question the reasons for the war. Nor did Russian
audiences enjoy seeing their forces engage in the terror bombing
31
that ensued when the ground forces failed to advance over land.
This media exposure, local resistance, and generals' refusal to
violate the constitution (in Babichev's case) by firing on
civilians, or support what they believed was a fiasco, along with
the incompetence of the troops, betrayed the hollowness of the
invasion plans.
Nor can one discern what objective could be gained by so
massive an operation. There is already talk of some sort of
Chechen referendum, which Russia will veto in the end or,
perhaps, some sort of negotiation about autonomy--a meaningless
concept in an utterly lawless state, especially when Yeltsin has
already named a new government of Russian puppets to take over
32
once the Russian army occupies Groznyi. In other words, Yeltsin
is now making up political objectives as he goes along. Strategic
failure has resulted in less than inspired improvisation.
Consequently, more troops have had to be sent to Chechnya.
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Finally, the possibility exists that other North Caucasian
Muslim forces will join with Chechnya against Russia and convert
the area into a true cauldron. This last consideration, directly
traceable to the strategic failure in Moscow, leads us to
consider the possibility that the Kremlin's actions could now
generate a real, not propaganda, Islamic threat. In effect,
Moscow could summon its own worst nightmare into being. While
earlier the area was seen as a source of many nasty conflicts, it
was not regarded as being in imminent danger of
33
"Lebanonization." Now Russia has given the many nationalities of
this area a reason to unite. Moreover, the Russians have revealed
themselves as brutal and incompetent; a lethal combination. For
these reasons, the invasion of Chechnya will make it much harder
to achieve a regional peace in the North Caucasus that is based
on compromise, mutual accommodation, and negotiations rather than
34
one based on force and Muscovite centralization. Thus the resort
to force majeure may trigger a series of long wars that will
further debilitate an already sick Russia.
While these are the immediately evident domestic
consequences of this invasion and suffice to explain its tragic
folly, they are not the only ones. Indeed, this action has
serious international repercussions. First, this war and the
brutality of Russia's terror bombing of innocent civilians risk
the good will which democratic Russia had been building in the
West. Even in the United States, which originally said this was
purely a Russian internal affair, protests by human rights groups
have begun to register. The same holds true in Europe and the
protests could lead to sanctions or raise other obstacles to
35
Russia's major foreign policy goals. The European Union's
refusal to let Turkey in, allegedly on human rights grounds
resulting from its Kurdish war, and U.S. aid reductions to Turkey
illustrate what might happen as a result of this tragic war.
Second, Russia's heavy-handed actions indicate its
supposedly neo-imperialist aims, undemocratic nature, and
reliance on covert operations to destabilize governments, as well
as its willingness to send in troops when all else fails. In
other words, Russia has gratuitously provided ammunition to all
those who regard Moscow as a threat and wish to wall it off from
influence in their region. More pointedly, since the use of
troops was a violation of the Vienna Document on Confidence and
Stability Building Measures of the Conference on Security and
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Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that said any concentration of over
40,000 troops must be communicated to the other signatories, and
the Budapest decisions of the CSCE that were signed five days
before the invasion, those violations could--and possibly will-be held against Russia as an indication of its unreliability, and
as reasons for not revising the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) treaty.
Revision of the treaty is a key Russian policy goal that has
36
now been endangered. Russia wants to gain permission to station
more troops, armored vehicles, and tanks in the North Caucasian
and northern flanks of Russia and this would necessitate revision
of the quotas that the treaty stipulates for Russia in those
flanks. If Russian claims to revise the CFE's flank quotas and
allow it to station more troops, tanks, and military vehicles are
rejected, Russia may renounce the CFE treaty and isolate itself
in Europe, thus provoking NATO's expansion. Or if Moscow accepts
the treaty it will have to accept conditions that limit its plans
for rebuilding the North Caucasian Military District into a major
front-line and versatile power base for military action in
Russia, the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and potentially the
Ukraine, which borders the district's western frontier. Assuming
that unrest continues throughout the area, acceptance of such
limitations puts a heavy burden on Russia's armed forces. That
burden's weight will be due to the fact that having started a
protracted war, Moscow will be unable to find other resources for
essential military construction. But if the Kremlin renounces the
treaty, Russian ambitions for a larger role in European security
will be blocked.
Third, although this invasion may seem to show that the
Russian armed forces are strategically and tactically
incompetent, Western analysts need to be cautious in assessing
the performance of Russian forces in Chechnya. It not advisable
to extrapolate too much from the seemingly poor performance of
Russian troops fighting in an unpopular war against their own
citizens. The tendency might be for the West to assume that a
seemingly substandard performance in Chechnya might mean Russian
forces could not adequately defend the nation's interest under
different circumstances elsewhere.
On the other hand, the way Moscow has handled the Chechen
situation could indicate that Russia is having an increasingly
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difficult time creating and enforcing order in its Muslim
peripheries. If Russia has to rely on brute force to maintain
order it will alienate itself from the West and dig itself into a
geopolitical hole across Eurasia. Furthermore, Moscow's actions
in Chechnya will further destabilize the state system in this
37
already fragmented "arc of crisis."
In time, democracy could have become the principle that
provided legitimacy to the force of state power throughout the
North Caucasus. But Moscow's actions may lead many to believe
that Russia has nothing to offer Asia but force. Unfortunately
for Moscow, many Asians may now feel that they do not have to be
intimidated by a Russia which has employed force both
illegitimately and with such seeming incompetence. Instead, those
in Asia and Europe who are so inclined may now be less reticent
to resist Russia, with unpredictable and potentially dangerous
results.
Precisely because the European security agenda is now
increasingly bound up with developments in the Caucasus, it will
be impossible, or at least highly unlikely that, in the event of
protracted war there or other such interventions, Europe can
remain aloof. As Lawrence Freedman recently wrote,
The tolerance of the European system to major uphevals
in Russia and/or the Ukraine should not be judged high.
Even smaller-scale ructions can become dangerous if
they start to threaten the equilibrium of a number of
countries. If there is an underlying tendency towards
instability, then the issue of intervention starts to
be seen in a different light. The interest in the
prevention of disorder takes on a higher value, because
there can be no less confidence that, left alone, most
conflicts will peter out as the belligerents become
38
exhausted.
Conclusion.
Our analysis of the Chechnya invasion is that it is
indicative of the larger issue of Russia's seeming failure to
create a viable state. If that is the case, the implications may
go beyond the individual issues of Chechnya's attempted secession
and the general complexities of the ethnic conflict problem in
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the CIS. The Chechnya invasion, and the way it is resolving, have
cast doubt on the ability of Boris Yeltsin and his colleagues to
create stable, lawful, and legitimate governing institutions in
Russia. The extent to which the civilian leadership can control
the army may also be in question. At the same time, the
government has shown too great a willingness to use military
force at home. Indeed, since 1989, Soviet and now Russian armed
forces have been used in Georgia, Azerbaijan (twice), the Baltic,
in Moscow (twice), throughout the Caucasus, and now again in
Chechnya to compel submission to Moscow. All these interventions
have failed, along with the covert operations that preceded them.
Accordingly, these failures have undermined not only Russia's
prestige and power abroad, but also threaten the foundations of
the post-Communist Russian state itself.
Even before the Chechen coups and the invasion, two Russian
analysts had already proclaimed that settling the minorities
issue in Russian society and managing the Soviet legacy are tasks
that must also include international institutions, not just the
39
ethnic minorities on the spot and the Moscow government.
Aleksandr' Konovalov and Dimitri Evstatiev's argument for
including international institutions is based on the fact that
those institutions alone can provide an objectivity and criteria
for settlement that eludes Russia because of the common
perception that Russia is "the main heir of the imperial past and
the main source of totalitarian practice in inter-ethnic
40
relations." This invasion has, if anything, enhanced the
validity of this argument and heightened the urgency of
international diplomatic and political intervention.
By invading Chechnya despite the aforementioned strategic
vulnerabilities, the actions of Yeltsin and his colleagues
suggest that they may not be able to manage that Soviet legacy
and preserve peace in Eurasia. Similarly, by trampling on Russian
democracy's fragile efforts to establish legal controls on
government actions and on the armed forces, Yeltsin has seemingly
repudiated his own statements of December 6, 1994 in Budapest
that "it was too early to bury Russian democracy."
If that is, indeed, the case then Yeltsin may have, in the
words of the poet Mayakovsky, "stepped on the throat of his own
song" to become the gravedigger of the third Russian Revolution
(1905 and 1917 being the first two). If European intervention in
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Russia due to proliferating violence, and/or the death of Russian
democracy come to pass, history will not soon forgive those who
have ignited the fire of war on their own territory without
having the means to put it out.
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